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UNAVOIDABLE JUDICIAL 
POWER AND INEVITABLE 
CHARTER CONTROVERSY 
Bruce Ryder
*
 
Since the middle of the twentieth century, Canada and many other 
democratic states have expanded judicial power to safeguard fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. This expansion has rested on two familiar 
premises. The first is that the conditions of true democracy are not exhausted 
by majority rule. Democracy also requires that political authorities respect the 
dignity, worth and basic interests of all individuals by protecting fundamental 
human rights and freedoms. The second is that an independent judiciary, 
precisely because it is not politically accountable, is best placed to implement 
rights-based checks on majoritarian political power. The acceptance of these 
now commonplace premises fuelled the adoption of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms1 in 1982, and the passage of judicially enforced 
entrenched bills of rights in many other countries in the Americas, Europe, 
Africa and Asia. As a matter of constitutional design, Canadians accepted in 
1982, and now take for granted, that judicial power to invoke human rights and 
freedoms to invalidate the actions of the other levels of government is crucial to 
our conception of democracy. 
While rights-based powers of judicial review are widely accepted as a 
legitimate, indeed necessary, feature of modern constitutional democracies, the 
Charter has from the beginning provoked charged debates about its appropriate 
uses. Because constitutional language is typically open-ended and therefore 
susceptible to many equally plausible interpretations, normative choice on contested 
political issues is an inevitable feature of constitutional rights adjudication. And 
because judges are neither politically representative nor accountable, and their 
interpretation of constitutional requirements not easily reversed, their forays 
________________________________________________________________ 
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1
 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
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into policy-making on contested terrain will always raise legitimacy concerns. 
The Constitution places boundaries on judicial power to restrict the policy 
choices of the other branches of government. If judges exercise this power 
outside the boundaries set by the Constitution, they are quite properly accused of 
usurping the powers of the democratically accountable branches of government. 
The problem is that the boundaries set on judicial power by constitutional 
documents cannot be clearly demarcated in advance. They are not self-executing. 
They end up having to be defined largely by the judges themselves. Hence, the 
question of legitimacy hovers unavoidably over any judicial interpretation of 
entrenched constitutional documents. 
Contemporary conceptions of democracy, then, simultaneously require 
judicial enforcement of constitutional rights and expose judges to vigorous 
challenge whenever they do so. Heated debate regarding the manner in which 
judicial power over constitutional interpretation is exercised goes with the 
territory in a well-functioning democracy. It follows that Justice Lamer was 
engaged in wishful thinking when he suggested, in the 1985 Motor Vehicle 
Reference, that “[a]djudication under the Charter must be approached free of any 
lingering doubts as to its legitimacy.”2 It is true that so long as the Charter 
remains in force, it must be approached without any doubts about the legitimacy 
of conferring interpretive power on the judiciary. The document has to be 
interpreted, and judges, as they have often reminded us, cannot shirk the 
responsibility conferred upon them. However, doubts about the legitimacy of 
judicial interpretations at the boundaries of Charter jurisprudence will always 
hover over the courts‟ work. 
In these circumstances, how should we go about contributing to debates that 
seek to measure and evaluate the courts‟ performance in discharging their 
constitutional responsibilities? What are the features of an appropriate approach 
to the exercise of judicial power? 
The expression “judicial activism” is a frequently used but unhelpful way of 
formulating the debate about the appropriate uses of judicial power. Often an 
unspoken set of assumptions animate allegations of judicial activism. The 
expression carries negative connotations — it suggests an illegitimate 
usurpation of the powers of the legislative or executive branches. It 
presupposes a baseline, an appropriate stance regarding judicial power that has 
been exceeded by a court. But how do we go about defining that baseline and 
thus determining what kinds of exercise of judicial power are appropriate? 
Constructive commentary should not label judicial review “active” or “passive” 
(if those terms are understood as meaning too much and too little judicial power 
________________________________________________________________ 
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respectively), until we have made clear what our standard or background theory 
is regarding the appropriate approach to the exercise of judicial power. 
In their book The Charter Revolution and the Court Party,3 F.L. Morton and 
Rainer Knopff put forward a critique of judicial power that essentially uses 
parliamentary supremacy as a baseline. Counter to the modern trend, their 
conception of democracy is essentially exhausted by majoritarian legislative 
processes. This leads them to define judicial activism as any exercise of the 
power of judicial review to override the policy choices of governments.4 In 
other words, whenever a judge upholds a Charter claim in the face of a contrary 
action based on government policy, activism has occurred. But the Charter 
requires interference with the policy choices of governments if they amount to 
unreasonable infringements of human rights and freedoms. Since, in Lorraine 
Weinrib‟s words, we have an “activist constitution,”5 judicial activism on the 
Morton and Knopff definition can only be avoided if judges irresponsibly 
abdicate their constitutional responsibilities. Put another way, if judicial 
activism is a bad thing, then the Morton and Knopff definition suggests that the 
appropriate level of rights-based judicial review is none. Their definition of 
activism calls into question the legitimacy of any judicial enforcement of rights 
and freedoms. Thus their analysis can be seen as a hankering for the pre-
Charter days of legislative supremacy largely unbridled by rights concerns. 
So, the enactment of the Charter obviously makes no judicial invalidation of 
governments‟ policy choices an inappropriate baseline for evaluating judicial 
power. Similarly, the baseline cannot be the pre-Charter judicial record when 
parliamentary supremacy was only partially constrained by principles of 
federalism and a limited set of constitutionally entrenched rights. The courts‟ 
record interpreting the Canadian Bill of Rights6 cannot set the baseline for the 
appropriate exercise of judicial power under the Charter, since the Bill of Rights 
embodies such a compromised and incomplete commitment to the judicial 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Can empirical data provide a useful measure of the exercise of judicial 
power? Can we say, for example, that a success rate of Charter claimants in the 
range of 50%, or 30%, or 10%, is evidence that judges are exercising their 
power appropriately? There are a number of problems in trying to rely on 
success rates to measure the exercise of judicial power. Any success rate that 
we might choose as appropriate would be arbitrary. Moreover, it is difficult to 
define with precision what counts as a Charter victory for a claimant.  
________________________________________________________________ 
3
 Morton and Knopff, eds. The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough, 
Ont.: Broadview Press, 2000). 
4
 Id., at 19. 
5
 Weinrib, “The Activist Constitution” (April 1999), Policy Options 27-30. 
6
  S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
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For example, in the Little Sisters case,7 the Supreme Court of Canada failed 
to deliver any meaningful remedy to address the serious violations of 
expressive freedoms and equality rights that occurred in the administration of 
the border censorship scheme by Canada Customs. One provision, relating to 
burden of proof, was struck down, while the bulk of the legislative scheme was 
left intact. A tabulation of results might count this case as a victory for Little 
Sisters. A closer reading reveals the ruling to be an extreme example of 
deference to Parliament and the executive branch. 
Similarly, in R. v. Sharpe,8 the Court upheld the Criminal Code offence of 
simple possession of child pornography.9 A tabulation based on results might 
count this as a failed Charter challenge to legislation. In fact, the Court saved the 
legislation only by engaging in the most extended use of the controversial 
“reading in” remedy it has employed to date. To limit the law‟s impact on section 
2(b) freedoms, the Court had to read in exceptions for the possession solely for 
private purposes of self-authored creative representations and visual recordings 
of one‟s own lawful sexual activity. A significant amount of judicial law-
making was necessary to preserve the most important aspects of Parliament‟s 
policy choice. The Sharpe case is thus an example of judicial activism in the 
service of judicial restraint, a formulation which may help demonstrate the 
limited utility of those terms in evaluating the exercise of judicial power. 
In any case, it would be a mistake to consider that judicial power is exercised 
when Charter claims are upheld, and judicial power is not exercised when 
Charter claims are dismissed. Similarly, it is a mistake to equate activism with 
the assertion of judicial power and restraint with its avoidance. When judges 
strike down legislation, they are normally asserting power in support of a Charter 
constituency aggrieved by a law and contrary to the wishes of a legislative 
majority. When they uphold legislation, they are normally asserting power in a 
manner aligned with a legislative majority and contrary to the interests of a 
Charter constituency aggrieved by the law. Neither assertion of power is neutral 
or prima facie more legitimate than the other in a constitutional design that does 
not identify democratic dictates with the outcomes of majoritarian politics.  
While empirical data on success rates is of limited utility in evaluating 
judicial power generally, it is useful in revealing which kinds of claims or 
claimants have more success, which judges are more receptive to Charter 
claims, and how patterns of decision-making have shifted over time. For 
example, we know that Charter claims that will have a direct impact on the 
distribution of material resources, such as claims brought by unions, workers or 
________________________________________________________________ 
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 Little Sisters Book and Art Emporium v. Canada (Minister of Justice), [2000] 2 S.C.R. 
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social assistance recipients, have had a low rate of success. Empirical data on 
success rates can also be useful in countering the wilder claims of Charter 
critics. For example, consider the assertion that the Court is unreceptive to 
equality claims, or conversely, that the Court‟s policy agenda is driven by 
equality-seeking groups. The record does not support a dramatic version of 
either claim. In fact, the success rate of section 15 claimants is modest. The 
Supreme Court has found unjustifiable violations of equality rights in slightly less 
than 30% of the section 15 cases it has decided.10 This includes a low rate of 
success for claims alleging discrimination on some enumerated grounds, such as 
sex, age and disability. This is not the record of a Court hostile to, or captured by, 
the claims of equality-seeking groups. 
One useful criterion for evaluating the exercise of judicial power in 
controversial constitutional cases, as Cass Sunstein has suggested,11 is to ask 
whether a court ruling has supported and enhanced democratic deliberation about 
the appropriate balance between the protection of fundamental human rights and 
freedoms and other legitimate state objectives. On this view, which has much in 
common with Peter Hogg and Allison Bushell‟s conception of Charter dialogue,12 
judges and legislatures are engaged in an interpretive partnership in relation to the 
Charter — they have joint responsibility for giving meaning to its open-textured 
language. Hogg and Bushell‟s study demonstrated that legislatures normally 
respond in some way to Charter rulings that invalidate legislation. It has become 
even clearer in recent years that the choices open to legislatures include 
complying with, revising, or even seeking to reverse the results of judicial 
rulings.  
The model of interpretive partnership, or constitutional dialogue, was enhanced 
significantly by the Supreme Court‟s 1999 ruling in the R. v. Mills13 case. This was 
the first time that the Court had considered a Charter challenge to a legislative 
sequel that departed from an earlier Charter ruling by the Court. Following the 
Court‟s ruling in R. v. O’Connor,14 Parliament had engaged in a careful 
consideration of the competing interests at stake when defence lawyers seek access 
to complainants‟ therapeutic records in sexual assault trials. This led to the passage 
________________________________________________________________ 
10
  Faria, Judicial Activism?: An Evaluation of Supreme Court of Canada Decision-Making 
in Section 15 Equality Cases (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, 2001) [on file with author]. 
11
 Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). 
12
 Hogg and Bushell, “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn‟t Such a Bad Thing After All)” (1997), 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 75; Hogg 
and Thornton, “Reply to „Six Degrees of Dialogue‟ ” (1999), 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 529. 
13
 [1999] 3 S.C.R. 668. 
14
 [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411. 
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of Bill C-46,15 a legislative regime that has much more in common with Justice 
L‟Heureux-Dubé‟s dissent than it does with the majority ruling in O’Connor.16 
Nevertheless, in Mills, the Court did not insist that Parliament slavishly adhere to 
the Court‟s previous interpretation of Charter requirements. Instead, it noted that 
Parliament had given close consideration to the Charter interests at stake, and had 
taken advantage of its ability to assess information and hear views not available to 
the Court. In upholding the legislation, the Court indicated that the courts “do not 
hold a monopoly” on the interpretation, protection and promotion of rights and 
freedoms. “Parliament also plays a role in this regard and is often able to act as a 
significant ally for vulnerable groups.”17  
Like the saga regarding therapeutic records that unfolded in the sequence of 
O’Connor, Bill C-46 and Mills, constitutional debates regarding limits on the 
use of evidence of complainants‟ sexual history in sexual assault trials is 
another example of a context where an exchange between courts and 
legislatures produced heightened democratic deliberation and careful 
consideration of the competing Charter claims in designing legislative solutions. 
Parliament‟s response (Bill C-49)18 to the R. v. Seaboyer19 ruling was upheld by 
the Court in R. v. Darrach.20 In contrast to the legislation at issue in Mills, the 
“rape shield” legislative sequel upheld in Darrach closely modelled the court‟s 
ruling in Seaboyer. Still, it is evident in the judgment in Darrach that the Court 
will not require that carefully considered legislative sequels adhere precisely to 
previous court rulings. 
The Mills and Darrach judgments demonstrate that the Charter dialogue 
between courts and legislatures is not a monologue, as some have suggested.21 The 
courts can and should give effect to a genuine interpretive partnership between 
courts and legislatures. The appropriate apportionment of interpretive responsibility 
must take into account the respective institutional strengths and weaknesses of 
courts and legislatures. When the basic rights of vulnerable minorities are at stake, 
especially when there is evidence that their interests were not treated with concern 
and respect in the legislative process, judges must insist on the primacy of their 
interpretive role and show little deference to legislative policy choices. When, on 
________________________________________________________________ 
15
  An Act to amend the Criminal Code (production of records in sexual offence 
proceedings), S.C. 1997, c. 30. 
16
 A review of the legislative process leading to the enactment of Bill C-46 can be found in 
Hiebert, Wrestling with Rights: Judges, Parliament and the Making of Social Policy (Montreal: 
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1999). 
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 R. v. Mills, supra, note 12, at para. 58. 
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  An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c. 38. 
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 [1991] 2 S.C.R. 577. 
20
 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443. 
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the other hand, the legislature has engaged in a concerted and sincere attempt to 
consider and balance competing Charter interests with other legitimate state 
objectives, their policy choices should not lightly be overruled by the courts. 
The O’Connor/Mills and Seaboyer/Darrach stories are examples of the positive 
exercise of judicial power because they had the effect of stimulating and supporting 
democratic deliberation and resulted in laws that balanced competing rights and 
freedoms in an intelligent and sensitive manner. On the other hand, the exercise of 
judicial power is problematic if courts uphold government policy choices that were 
not formulated in a manner that gave appropriate consideration and regard to the 
Charter interests at stake. The Little Sisters and Sharpe cases were both examples of 
situations where the Supreme Court excused Parliament from undertaking any 
serious democratic deliberation about Charter rights and freedoms in designing 
legislative policies.  
In Little Sisters, the legislative regime of border censorship was found to have 
violated the expressive freedoms and equality rights of a cultural institution 
representing vulnerable sexual minorities. The Court ought to be on high alert 
when its anti-majoritarian role is so obviously called into play. Despite the fact 
that the legislation treated expressive material no differently than other imported 
goods, and despite the fact that Parliament had not undertaken any steps to assess 
the legislation‟s impact or to review alternatives, the Court said it would be too 
onerous to require legislators to do these things. Instead, it left the onus on Little 
Sisters to pursue further litigation if problems persisted.  
In Sharpe, even though an offence of simply possessing expressive material 
was added to our criminal law for the first time, even though it was drafted by 
Parliament with no public debate about its impact on section 2(b) freedoms, and 
even though the Court found the law to be unjustifiably broad, the Court again let 
Parliament off the hook by correcting the most egregious flaws in the legislation 
itself. In both cases, the Court‟s rulings encourage Parliament to be cavalier about 
its constitutional duties, and they discourage future democratic deliberation about 
the appropriate scope of Charter rights and freedoms in the context of border 
censorship or possession offences, even though none occurred in the first place. 
In these areas, the interpretive partnership that ought to animate the Charter has 
been stalled at the outset. 
In summary, I have suggested that the debate about the appropriate uses of 
judicial power would be advanced if we dropped the misleading labels of 
“activism” and “restraint,” and instead recognized that the exercise of judicial 
power is an unavoidable aspect of Charter adjudication. Rights-based judicial 
review is essential to our conception of democracy, and yet, paradoxically, judges 
are inescapably embroiled in controversy about the democratic legitimacy of their 
interpretation of the Charter. Empirical evidence of the success rate of Charter 
claims is of limited assistance in assessing whether judicial power is being 
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exercised in an appropriate manner. Instead, I have suggested that one useful way 
of evaluating the exercise of judicial power is to ask whether it fosters greater 
democratic deliberation about the appropriate scope of rights and freedoms and an 
interpretive partnership between courts and legislatures that is attentive to their 
respective institutional strengths and weaknesses. 
